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DEFINITION O F  TERMS 
Within the context of this study the general t e rms  listed below a r e  used 
as defined: 
COMPONENT: A combination of parts, devices and structure, usually 
self-contained, which performs a distinctive function in the operation 
of the overall equipment. In the course of a Project, 
qualification testing, replacements within a spacecraft and provisioning 
for  flight spares  a r e  performed at the component level. 
A "Black box. 
DEVICE: Electromechanical o r  mechanical items which perform a 
specific function and a r e  intermediate in complexity between piece parts 
and components. Examples are: valves, small motors, gyros, solenoids. 
FAILURE/ANOMALY: The inability of an art icle to function as intended 
o r  within i ts  specified tolerance per the applicable documents. For  this 
study these a r e  the formally documented incidents which have occurred 
during ground test  o r  flight operation. 
FLIGHT ACCEPTANCE: A ser ies  of operating tests and environmental 
exposures performed on a flight item to determine compliance with 
acceptance requirements. 
PART: One piece o r  two o r  more  pieces joined together which a r e  not 
normally subject to disassembly without destruction of design use. 
this study parts a r e  considered as elements of electrical circuits. 
For  
QUALIFICATION: A test o r  se r ies  of tests conducted to determine 
whether an item of hardware meets qualification requirements. 
study, qualification infers completing a ser ies  of operational tests per-  
formed in conjunction with environmental exposures. 
For this 
SUBSYSTEM: A subsystem consists of one o r  more  interconnected 
components and performs a major operating function within a spacecraft. 
vi 
ABBREVIATIONS 
AGE: Aerospace Ground Equipment. These a r e  the electrical and 
mechanical test equipment employed in ground operation of a space- 
craft. 
DSN: The deep space communication network. 
ETR: The Eastern Test  Range, Cape Kennedy, Florida. 
RTG: Radioactive Thermoelectric Generators. A unit which employs 
the heat of radioactive decay to generate electricity by thermoelectric 
phenomenon. 
WTR: Western Test Range, California. 
V i i  
1.0 SUMMARY 
This report documents a study undertaken to identify actual 
experience contained in recent space programs having features related to 
the Viking Lander. 
long life, system complexity, atmosphere entry and RTG operation. The 
study does not include rocket engine terminal descent, inertial guidance, or 
extended on-planet operations. The data is intended to provide a baseline 
to support evaluation and planning for the Viking Lander Project. 
The features considered were mission science operation, 
Four space programs were selected for the study: Lunar Orbiter, 
Mariner 69, Biosatellite, and Nimbus B. 
have been collected and ordered in detail sufficient to define the flight 
and ground failure! anomalies, hardware and mission configurations, and 
tes t  programs. The data has been processed into tables, charts,  graphs and 
analyses in depth sufficient to establish the cause-effect correlations between 
space program activities and potential flight problems. 
of the study has been toward ear ly  identification of potential problems for the 
Viking Lander, however the data presented in this report  could prove useful 
for space projects in general. 
Data from the four programs 
The specific direction 
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2.0 INTRODUCTION 
This report  describes a study undertaken at the direction of the Viking Project 
Office of the NASA Langley Research Center. 
available data f rom recent space projects, identifying the cause and effect of 
problems, and then making an assessment for the potential impact of these 
problems upon a new space project. F o r  this study the data was taken from 
the Lunar Orbiter, Mariner '69, Biosatellite, and Nimbus B programs and 
applied to the Viking Lander Project. 
The sihdy consisted of compiling 
All  four of the completed projects achieved major successes, yet each suffered 
flight aaomalies which resulted in  some data loss and required in-flight work- 
arounds. 
occurrence of unexpected problems are indications of less  than complete 
understanding of the design requirements and operational environments. 
flight problems also suggest that improvements a r e  in  order  for the controls 
employed throughout design, manufacture, test and flight operations. 
The repetitive nature of a number of flight problems and the 
The 
2.1 Expected Application of the Report 
This report  has been prepared to identify the actual experience of past space 
programs having features related to the Viking Lander in order  to provide a 
baseline for  evaluating program activities and design features (mission and 
hardware) in  the Viking Lander program. 
activities has been directed to application for  the Viking Lander, this report  
should prove useful to support space programs in  general. 
While the attention of the study 
This report  will support planning and trade-off decisions by providing material 
to judge the cause-effect correlation between program activities and flight 
problems in the following areas:  
(a) Design - Previous design problems, failure modes, persistent problems, 
limitations of advanced hardware, effects of late modifications, and etc. have 
been identified and reviewed to support future desigo and assurance activities. 
(b) Test  Program - The past test programs have been identified and reviewed 
relative to flight results to provide data for  evaluating future test programs. 
(c) Assurance A c t i v i e  - Failure modes and classes  of risk have been identified 
and evaluated in terms which can be correlated with the effectiveness of the 
applicable program controls . 
2.2 Selection of Space Programs for  Study 
Four space programs were selected for this study on the basis of their  ability 
to contribute space program experience pertinent to the Viking program. The 
cr i ter ia  governing this selection consisted of: 
2-1 
0 
hardware configuration. 
Configuration - Resemblance to features of Viking Lander mission and 
0 Management - Programs originating with several  NASA centers and per- 
forming contractors, representing different approaches to a successful space 
program. 
Complexity and Life - Heavy units with complex interacting subsystems 
and long flight duration. 
0 
rep r e s  enting different opportunities for growth. 
Maturity - Projects including both single mission and continuing projects, 
The comparison of the Viking Lander and the selected programs a r e  shown 
summarized in  Tables 2-1 and 2-2. The following subsections discuss the 
features of these programs. 
2.2.1 VIKING LANDER - NASA-LRC Management, MMC Contractor 
The Viking mission includes requirements for long life, multi-vehicle mission 
operation, complex science powered from a nuclear source, entry, and decel- 
eration into an atmosphere, a "soft" landing on Mars  and a 90-day period of 
science and engineering measurements. Many of Viking's general mission re -  
quirements a r e  common within the four space flight programs selected for  
analysis in this study. 
and 2-2. 
selection: 
Their characterist ics a r e  summarized in  Tables 2- 1 
The following features of the Viking Lander contributed to their 
Mission Phases - Space cruise,  entry, landing, and surface operations. 
Hardware Elements - 'Science, RTG, guidance and control, programmer- 
computer , c ommxini c ation s. 
Complexity - Weight, number of microcircuits, parts count, devices, 
complex inte rac ting sub sys tems . 
- Life - Fourteen months dormancy in space, followed by planetary entry, 
landing, and 90 days surface operations. 
2.2.2 LUNAR ORBITER - NASA-LRC Management, Boeing Contractor 
This program represented an example of a short t e rm project response (2 years  
f rom contract s ta r t  to first launch) for hardware design, fabrication, test, and 
flight. The Lunar Orbiter spacecraft was designed to operate for  a 30-day 
2- 2 
Lunar photographic primary mission followed by reduced level Operation for up 
to one year. 
(1966-1967), as planned. 
electro-mechanical devices. 
within the Programmer-  Computer which was commandable and reprogrammable 
with both real  time and stored commands. Significant relative to Viking, Lunar 
Orbiter flights were conducted with simultaneous operation of more than one 
s pac e c raft . 
It accomplished this objective and culminated in  5 flights 
The spacecraft employed many mechanical and 
Large quantities of microcircuits were contained 
2.2.3 MARINER 69 - JPL Management and Contractor 
Mariner 69 provided two successful flights (Mariner 6 and 7) from one launch 
window in 1969. These flights of the Mariner se r ies  offer the unique instance 
of an ongoing program incorporating major design changes to the flight space- 
craft  systems. The inclusion of the digital Central Computer and Sequencer 
into the 69 configuration introduced the use of more  than 2000 microcircuits 
into the spacecraft subsystems. 
Viking because of successfully accomplishing a Martian mission and because 
of the wealth of technical and operation background at JPL.  
Moreover, the Mariner Spacecraft relates to 
2.2.4 BIOSATELLITE - NASA-Ames Management, General Electric/RESD 
Contractor 
The Biosatellite program consisted of two phases with a degree of overlap. 
initial "3-dayl' (Biosatellite I and 11) configuration culminated in  two flights of 
nominally three days (1966-67). 
attitude control, command, telemetry, deorbit and recovery capability were 
developed. 
day flight (1 969) and added fuel cell power, life support, and active thermal 
control. 
all the resulting systems and operational complexity. 
hardware capabilities realized in flight included such diverse items as acceleration 
rate control of l ess  than earth g 's ;  controlled gamma ray irradiation of live 
biologicals i n  flight; psychomotor games played by a primate in flight; and real  
time telemetry of brain waves (electro-encephalograms). Of the four spacecraft 
studied, only the Biosatellites made controlled atmospheric reentries from orbit. 
The 
In this phase the spacecraft heat shields, 
The "Primate" configuration (Biosatellite 111) was designed for 30- 
The Biosatellites were automated orbiting biological laboratories with 
Some of the precision 
2.2.5 NIMBUS B - NASA-Goddard Management, General Electric/SD Contractor 
Nimbus is another example of a continuous program with numerous evolutionary 
changes incorporated throughout its history; Nimbus flights a r e  used for  R&D testing 
and operation of weather satellite (meteorological) equipment and other related ex- 
periments. 
ferometer spectrometer, infrared spectrometer, UV solar energy monitor, and an 
In particular, the B spacecraft payload consisted of a camera, inter- 
2-3 
experiment for  locating remote te r res t r ia l  sensors. 
required complicated programming to operate multiple experiments and 
record and play back their data. Nimbus B carr ied two SNAP 19 RTG power 
sources as experiments to evaluate their  performance and reliability. 
SNAP 19 RTG power source is essentially the same type Viking will employ. 
Nimbus B also car r ies  two sets of tape recorders,  one set  similar to that 
proposed for Viking. Nimbus equipment has operated continuously for 18 
months in space and approximately equals that proposed for the Viking Lander. 
The Nimbus systems 
The 
2.3 Study Approach 
The study included collection, processing, and evaluation of project data as 
described in the following two paragraphs. 
2.3. 1 Data Collection 
The following types of data were gathered for each of the four programs 
studied: 
(1) 
effect, date of occurrence, and report  code number. 
in  full in Section 3 herein, and in addition the data has been processed to 
establish patterns in Sections 4 and 5. 
All  Failure/Anomalies in  Flight - Identifying failure description, cause, 
This material  is tabulated 
(2) 
cause, effect, date of occurrence, and report code number. This material 
also was processed into useful patterns in Sections 4 and 5. The individual failures 
a r e  too voluminous for  inclusion in  this report. 
All  Failure/Anomalies in  Ground Testing - Identifying failure description, 
( 3 )  Hardware and Mission Configurations - Identifying systems, components, 
parts counts, and mission profiles. 
and tables in Section 6. 
included for comparison. 
This mater ia l  is reduced to block diagrams 
Preliminary Viking Lander configuration data has been 
(4) 
program, environment types and levels in detail. This information i s  inter-  
preted by hardware utilization flow block diagrams and detailed comparative 
charts of the tes t  environment types and levels i n  Section 7. 
Lander test program planning has been included for comparison. 
Test  Programs - Identifying hardware quantities and flow through the test 
Preliminary Viking 
The collection of the data for  the four selected programs ranged from review 
of published summary reports on Lunar Orbiter to sifting of original failure 
reports in Nimbus B log books. 
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2 . 3 . 2  Data Processing and Evaluation 
The failure/anomaly data f rom ground test  and flights were reduced to 
incident, cause, effect and previous history. These reduced data were com- 
bined for each program into groups of interest  to this study. 
included failure classes,  which a r e  related to hardware risks;  flight and test  
failure modes, which are related to responsible agency; chronology of ground 
test  incidents; and various categories of failure mechanisms. 
data and consultations with project technical authorities assisted in the inter-  
pretation of the failure mechanism data. 
These groups 
Unpublished 
Other information was organized to provide mission and equipment details, 
use and flow of hardware, nature of the test  programs, equivalent parts count, 
and functional block diagrams. 
The data described above were compared with comparable material  for  the 
Viking Lander for  reference. 
ically portrayed to present the relative distributions of failure classes for  
each program as well as distributions of failure modes and failure mechanisms 
fo r  both flight and ground test. 
Basic comparisons were then made and graph- 
As a result of comparing the reduced data among all the programs considered 
in  this study, a number of conclusions and recommendations a r e  presented. 
2.4 Descriptions of Report Contents 
Each section of this report contains material  which can be used relatively 
independently of the others. 
the contents of each succeeding section is described as follows: 
To facilitate the location of specific information, 
Section 3, Failures in Space - Tables itemize all flight failure/anomaly incidents 
which occurred in the projects. 
a r e  provided for each incident along with the designation of failure c lass  and mode. 
The text defines significant flight incidents and flight failure classes. 
data is then summarized in te rms  of these defined concepts. 
Section 4, Failure Modes - The contents include definitions of failure modes, 
tabulation of the failure modes for each program for both flight and ground 
test, and graphical representations of ground tes t  failure mode distributions and 
chronological patterns. 
Cause and effect descriptions and prior history 
The flight 
The data a r e  interpreted and summarized in the text. 
Section 5, Application of Experience to Viking - This section presents tabu- 
lations of incidents with hardware closely related to the Viking Lander, describes 
interface problems, and identifies persistent problem areas .  
2-5 
Section 6, Description of Spacecraft - This section provides details of the 
missions, equipments, functions, and parts counts for each program. 
Section 7, Test Programs - This section contains diagrams of hardware 
utilization (including test art icles),  detailed tables of the system and 
component qualification and acceptance test programs, and discussions 
of the comparative test programs. 
- Section 8, Conclusions and Recommendations - This section presents the 
conclusions drawn from this study and resulting recommendations. 
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3.0 FAILURE AND ANOMALY EXPERIENCE FROM SPACE FLIGHT 
This section presents the failure and anomaly data from space flight and 
establishes relationships between the flight data and ground tes t  results. 
The relationships established for these data become one of the base points 
for  assessing potential flight problems in new programs. 
appearing in this section provide descriptions and discussions as follows: 
The material  
e 
failure anomaly incidents. 
The basic flight data is described and presented in te rms  of flight 
o 
incidents (defined in 3.2) and risk classifications (defined ih 3. 3.1) and failure 
modes (defined in 4.0) 
e 
by observations drawn from the distribution of significant flight incidents 
within the classification of risk. 
The flight data is screened and classified in  terms of significant f 1 i g h t 
Relationships between flight data and ground test  results are established 
The mater ia l  in this section is  presented in  the following figures and tables: 
Table 3-1 
3-2 
3-3 
3-4 
3-5 
3-6 
Summary of Flight Failures and Anomalies for  the 
Projects Studied 
Summary of Failures and Anomalies f rom Lunar Orbiter 
Flight Experience 
Summary of Failures and Anomalies f rom Mariner '69 
Flight Experience 
Summary of Failures and Anomalies f rom Biosatellite 
Flight Experience 
Summary of Failures and Anomalies from Nimbus B 
Flight Experience 
Summary of Flight Problems Experienced on More Than 
One Program 
Figure 3 - 1 Summary of Data, Flight Failure Classifications 
3. 1 Data From Space Flight 
Tables 3-2 through 3-5, inclusive, present descriptions of all the failure/ 
anomaly incidents reported in  the course of flight operations for  each of the 
projects within the study. 
each of the projects. Wherever flight incidents had a previous history from 
ground testing o r  other flights, the related experience is  described. The 
tables presenting the individual programs have been organized as follows: 
These data are presented a s  separate tables for 
3-1 
Lunar Orbiter, Table 3-2 - The project consisted of 5 flights and reported 
63 incidents. The data a r e  presented in  16 groups of either similar incidents 
o r  a ser ies  of incidents involving a single i tem of spacecraft equipment 
(e.g., Star Trackers ,  Power Losses). For  reference the individual incidents 
are identified by their  documented failure/anomaly ' report  number such as 
LO-11-A7 (Roman numeral identifies flight spacecraft). 
Mariner '69, Table 3-3 - The project had 2 simultaneous flights and reported 
43 incidents. The data a r e  presented in  18 groups arranged in flight chronology 
(e.g., Mariner 6 Launch, Mariner 7 Launch, Star Sensor problems). Individual 
incidents a r e  .identified by the J P L  problem/failure report number (PFR) with a 
suffix digit to show which spacecraft (6 o r  7). 
Biosatellite, Table 3-4 - The project had 3 flights and reported 47 incidents. 
The data a r e  presented in 14 groups which identify the function o r  equipment - 
involved (e. g., failure to de-orbit, reversed G switches, IR sensors). The 
individual incidents are identified by the flight spacecraft and the failure trans - 
mittal numbers. 
Nimbus B, Table 3-5 - This project has one continuing flight and reported 46 
incidents. These data a r e  presented in 12 groups in  order  of the first appear- 
ance of a problem o r  a defect in an item of spacecraft equipment @..g., 
electrical pa r t  failures, tape recorder  problems). The individual incidents 
a r e  identified by the i tem number assigned in the Nimbus monthly report. 
Common Problems, Table 3-6 - Table 3-6 l is ts  problems which occurred on 
more than one project* and shows cross  references to the failures and anomalies 
presented in the tables of flight incidents. A total of 46 incidents covering 13 
problems have occurred; these included both operating anomalies and defects in  
spacecraft equipment. 
3.2 Significant Flight Incidents 
The fttilure and anomaly incidents reported from flight describe problems which 
have taken many forms. Fo r  example, components and sub-assemblies have 
slowly degraded in  the course of a long flight. 
which perturbed more  than one subsystem within the spacecraft and involved 
several  interfaces. 
erated side effects which la te r  resulted in new problems. 
were screened to identify the actual incidents which perturbed the 'flights. 
incidents a r e  termed significant, and these significant flight incidents are used 
as the basis for the comparisons presented in this study. 
cr i ter ia  were employed to identify significant flight incidents: 
Complex problems have appeared 
Also, the flight work-arounds for one anomaly have gen- 
Therefore, flight data 
Such 
The following 
3-2 
1. 
damaging affect on the flight spacecraft. 
Spacecraft Origin - The problem o r  anomaly must have had a potentially 
2.  
separately. 
persisted in  spite of corrective modifications incorporated into succeeding 
spacecraft. 
Same Incidents in  Separate Spacecraft - These incidents a r e  counted 
This accounting includes the cases where operating difficulties 
An example is the Lunar Orbiter Star Sensor. 
3. 
event. 
Nimbus spacecraft during over-flight of specific areas on earth. 
Continuing o r  Cyclic Incidents - These incidents a r e  considered a s  one 
An example appears as the spurious switchings experienced by the 
4. 
These incidents a r e  counted separately. 
which can simultaneously degrade due to both flutter and head contamination 
effects. 
Multiple Failure Mechanisms within a Particular Component o r  Subsystem - 
Typical examples a r e  tape recorders  
5. 
a r e  not included unless there was a further work-around. 
case of Lunar Orbiter camera thermal door. 
struck by s t ray light, fogged whdows, and distorted video signals a r e  not 
included as significant flight incidents. 
Secondary Problems Arising from a Flight Work-Around - These incidents 
An example i s  the 
The secondary effects of film 
6. 
incidents are not included. 
earth shadow. 
Transitory o r  Undamaging Incidents of a Predictable Nature - These 
An example is the Lunar Orbiter Launch into the 
7. 
Orbiter data reported problems within the DSN and the Photo Ground Recon- 
struction Equipment during the course of flight operations. 
Ground Equipment Problems - These incidents a r e  not included. Lunar 
1 
Significant flight incidents appear as separate entries throughout the tables of 
flight data. 
repetition shown by number. 
a r e  appropriately indicated as "no failure", "not in  spacecraft", "predictable", 
"continuingtt, o r  llsecondarylg. 
Multiple occurrences of the same event a r e  listed one time with the 
Flight incidents which do not meet the cr i ter ia  
3.3 Relationship of Flight Failures to Ground Testing 
3.3.1 Flight Risk Classifications 
Flight incidents have been classified as risks in te rms  of ground tes t  problems 
which carr ied over into flight. 
to flight incidents have been classified as follows : 
For  the purposes of this study the r isks  assigned 
3-3 
I. 
materials,  and processes. 
- Standard Risk - The risk associated with well established parts,  
11. 
In each case the problem was not completely removed, and the potential 
failure was considered an acceptable risk as to chance and consequence of 
occur ring. 
Accepted Risk - - Problems with a previous history from ground testing. 
111. 
were intended to uncover these defects; however, by some means they 
escaped and la ter  appeared in flight. 
Undetected by Ground Test - The ground tests and inspections employed 
IV. New Effect - The first appearance of the problem was during flight. 
The risk classifications appear in the tables of flight incidents (Tables 3-2 
through 3-5) as Roman Numerals in the column identified a s  "Class". 
addition, these classifications appear in the c ross  references for common 
flight problems (Table 3-6). 
In 
3.3.2 Risk Classifications Within the Significant Flight Incidents - Ground 
tes t  results were related to flight failures in te rms  of sources and effects, 
respectively. Table 3-1 and Figure 3-1 present distributions of risk class- 
ifications for the significant incidents of each project, as precentages and 
as numbers of incidents, respectively. Comparing the distributions within the 
projects and across  the projects permit the following observations: 
I. 
made the major contribution to the number of reported flight failure in- 
cidents in any of the projects. 
f rom standard risks were increased a s  the result of project decisions: 
Standard Risks - Well established par ts ,  materials,  and processes have not 
Fo r  Biosatellite and Nimbus B the contributions 
0 Biosatellite Thermistors:  The temperature monitor thermistors 
were redundantly supported by other sensors within the 3-Day space- 
craft. 
prelaunch operations and such failures account for 3 of the 5 standard 
risk incidents reported for  Biosatellite. 
in Section 4.1) 
Consequently thermistors failures were not repaired during 
(A further discussion appears 
0 The Nimbus B spacecraft employed a number of commercial grade 
par ts  and electrical part  failures account for  all but one of the incidents 
reported for this class. 
3 -4 
11. 
originated the largest  number of flight incidents in  all the projects except 
Nimbus B. 
source was advanced hardware which had been configured for the particular 
spacecraft application. 
recorders,  rate gyros, transponders, and pyro valves. The second source 
was from system operating problems. In the course of ground testing these 
problems had been resolved to a condition considered tolerable for the 
particular mission (an example is an EM1 sensitivity shown by test  to have 
a 6 db operating margin). 
incidents all originated in  advanced hardware; the system operating problems 
had been resolved with ear l ier  spacecraft. 
Accepted Risks - Problems with a history of failures in ground testing 
The problems reported in  flight came from two sources. One 
These equipments included such items as tape 
In the particular case of Nimbus B, the flight 
111. 
had problems which escaped the intended tests o r  inspections and caused 
failure incidents in flight. 
to escape testing and the mechanisms which caused these problems are the 
subjects for  the la te r  portions of this study. 
ground tes t  results (or  absence of results in  this case) the.originating 
sources can be summarized a s  follows. 
Undetected byGround Test - Significantly, all the projects in  the study 
The circumstances which allowed these problems 
In relating the incidents to 
0 Defects traceable to manufacturing operations appeared in  all projects. 
0 Additional sensitivities to transient pulses appeared in  all but Nimbus B. 
0 Reversed polarities with direction sensitive equipment appeared on 
Mariner and Biosatellite. 
0 A complex electromechanical unit in Biosatellite was flown without 
previous environmental qualification. 
0 Evidence of undetected thermal vacuum and vibration sensitivities 
appeared i n  Lunar Orbiter. 
IV. 
sources reported by flight inc,idents a r e  summarized as follows: 
New Effects - New effects appeared in  all the projects studied. The 
0 Untried hardware problems such as operation of star sensors. 
0 Loss of contact o r  unexpected damage to the spacecraft (Lunar 
Orbiter IV, Mariner VII). 
a Encounter of new o r  unexpected environments. Incidents f rom this 
source have continuously perturbed the operation of Nimbus B. 
3 - 5  
3. 3. 3 Risk Classification within Compromising Flight Incidents 
Throughout the previous discussions, flight incidents have been considered 
without regard to the impact upon the particular flight mission. 
in  this study all enjoyed successful space flights and by a large majority 
anomalous incidents fell within the capabilities of the individual spacecraft. 
Therefore, a further correlation of flight failures and risk sources has been 
performed. This correlation limited the flight incidents to those which were 
considered compromising to the flight mission. 
The projects 
A flight failure was considered compromising i f  the incident had any of the 
following results: 
e The incident caused the loss  of any mission strience data. 
o The incident caused any loss to the control of the spacecraft. 
IB The incident resulted in  termination of RF contact. 
e The incident resulted in  premature termination of flight operations. 
The numbers of incidents which compromised flights and the numbers of space- 
craft  suffering ear ly  termination (or  loss) a r e  summarized in Table 3-1. 
distribution of these data into risk classifications appear below: (These incidents 
a r e  indicated by "x" in  the Tables 3 - 2  through 3 - 5 )  
The 
Project 
Compromising 
Incidents 
Risk Class 
I V  -I I1 - I1 -I - 
LUNAR ORBITER 9 3 2* 3 1* 
MARINER 7 0 4 2 1 
BIOSATELLITE 13 1;: 6 5 1 
4 - 0 - 2 - 1 -7 - NIMBUS 
TOTALS 36 5 14 10 7 
*Includes an incident which resulted in premature flight termination. 
Observations drawn from these data a r e  as follows: 
I. 
promised flights. 
example. For  Lunar Orbiter 2 of the incidents were pa r t  f a  i l u  r e  s i n  t h e  
Photo Subsystem, and 1 was a capacitor in the traveling wave tube amplifier 
Standard Risk - Standard risk items have provided sources which com- 
The Biosatellite failure to deorbit was the outstanding 
3-6  
(evidence exists that an improper capacitor had been installed); Fo r  Nimbus 
B a capacitor failure in the Infra Red Spectrometer degraded one channel after 
about 700 hours of flight. 
11. Accepted - Risk - Problems with a previous history in ground testing 
provided 40 p e r c z  of the compromising flight incidents. 
reported 1 was related to a system operating problem of low voltage 
stability (LO-V-A4); the balance were caused by advanced hardware as 
follows : 
Of the 14 incidents 
0 Unproven Hardware, Biosatellite Psychomotor game - pellet 
feeder, 5 incidents. 
0 Airborn Tape Recorders, 5 incidents involving Mariner, Biosatellite 
and Nimbus B. 
0 TV Cameras Mariner 
0 Plugged Cryostat, Mariner 
e Camera Thermal Door, Lunar Orbiter 
III. Undetected in Ground Test - The second largest  contributer to mission 
data losses  were effects which escaped detection in the tests and inspections 
applied. Reviewing these incidents revealed the following sources: 
0 EM1 caused the Mariner incidents and one incident with Lunar Orbiter. 
0 Biosatellite was compromised twice by reversed polarities (one 
mechanical, one electrical) and the unproven hardware item described 
previously. 
0 The Lunar Orbiter Photo Systems showed evidence of a vibration induced 
change to a delicate adjustment during one Flight (IV) and for  the last 
flight, a shortened segment of film/developer Bimat was installed in 
the supply magazine. 
IV. 
measures  of the margins built into the spacecraft and designed into the total 
system. The margins include: 
New Effects - The abilities to accomodate unexpected o r  new effects are 
0 Extra capability to withstand environments 
e Extra operating capability (power, controls, expendables) 
0 Alternate operating modes 
3-7 
New effects comprised 33 of the 139 significant flight incidents. 
causes of new effects have ranged f rom untried hardware to new 
environments. 
data only 7 times and 2 of these events were loss of contact with the 
spacecraft. (Lunar Orbiter IV, completely - Mariner 7, temporarily). 
The other five compromising events were induced by unexpected 
environmental factors. 
interest  for  comparisons to the Viking Lander and a r e  the subject of 
further discussion elsewhere in this study (Section 5). The ability to 
accomodate new effects as shown by the reported flight data confirms 
the original selection premise that these projects were well conceived and 
well executed; therefore, they provide a suitable base for making further 
comparisons. 
The 
In the course of 10 flights n e w  effects have compromised 
These environmental effects are of particular 
3-8  
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4 , O  FAILURE MODES 
The previous section presented details of failure mechanisms which caused 
flight failures. To organize the data into useful tabulations, the following 
modes of failure were assigned as appropriate. The parenthesized letter 
for  each mode i s  the corresponding code used elsewhere in  this report 
for brevity. 
ID 
design of an i tem such that a change to the design was required to eliminate 
o r  minimize the problem. 
Design Problems (D) - An incident attributed to a shortcoming in the 
Electrical Part Failure (P) - A hardware failure correctable by replace- 
ment of an electrical  part  with another of the same o r  equivalent type and 
requiring no circuit design change. 
Device Failure (G) - A hardware failure correctable by replacement of 
an electromechanical o r  mechanical item with another of the same or equiv- 
alent type. 
Manufacturing (M) - A hardware failure caused by improper producing 
operations o r  processes. 
e Test (T) - An incident o r  irregularity incurred during a test, originating 
from sources under the control of tes t  organizations (and not directly 
attributable to the hardware under test). 
e 
to one of the preceding modes o r  inconclusively described o r  analyzed. 
Miscellaneous o r  Unknown (X) - An event o r  anomaly not attributable 
These failure modes classify the incidents as to the agency responsible for  
the deficiency, and thus support decision making to prevent recurrence of 
the failures. For  example, Design Engineering and Reliability clearly must 
resolve the design deficiencies and must also evaluate the part and device 
failures to determine whether the reliability of these items is sufficiently 
high to support program goals. 
corrective and preventive action by manufacturing and quality operations. 
Test  failures require corrective action by the tes t  and/or quality organization 
in tes t  operations, facilities, o r  the preparation of test procedures. The 
miscellaneous o r  unknown category mer i t s  special attention by all parties to 
resolve uncertainties e 
Similarly, manufacturing failures require 
These failure modes a r e  identified for flight as well a s  ground test  problems. 
The addition of mission operational difficulties due. to the communication 
interface i s  considered a design problem since it requires engineering action. 
4- 1 
The failure mode distributions by program are presented in Figures 4-1 
and 4-2, and evaluated in Sections 4-1 and 4-2 herein. 
to the following general observations: 
This data has led 
1. 
failure incidents. 
Manufacturing and tes t  failure modes generated half o r  more of the 
2. 
ficiencies continued across  all phases of test operation and persisted into 
flight. 
Design deficiencies were a major effect; the uncovering of these de- 
3. 
deficiencies known from ground test. 
The most cri t ical  o r  mission limiting flight problems were design 
4. 
tes t  failures, however they became more  significant i n  flight. 
Part and device failures were not a major quantitative cause of ground 
5. Continuing type programs did not enjoy fewer flight anomalies. 
6. 
functional testing under ambient conditions. 
Relative to environments, the majority of failures were uncovered in 
7. 
however, all experienced serious malfunction o r  degradation to varying 
degrees. 
In flight, 10 of the 11 vehicles studied completed their missions; 
4. 1 Failure Modes in Space Flight 
In Section 3 the flight failures and anomalies of the four programs a r e  
described, together with the cause of each. 
additionally identify the failure mode for  each incident. In most cases 
these were identified by the project records o r  by contact with project 
personnel. In a few cases a single failure mode selection could not be 
determined with certainty, and prorated probabilities were assigned to each 
possible mode, based on judgment. The combinations were so determined 
that the total of all the mode probabilities for  a given incident was unity. 
The application of this technique minimizes individual e r r o r s  which tend to 
be  averaged out when a number of incidents are involved. 
jective interpretation was kept to a minimum. 
Tables 3-2 through 3-5 
In all cases sub- 
Table 4-1 and Figure 4-1 present a summary of the flight failure mode 
distributions by percent for each program studied. 
and of flights are also included. 
this table since it is not applicable to flight failures. 
The numbers of failures 
The Test (T) failure mode does not appear in 
4-2 
The distributions in Table 4- 1 and Figure 4- 1 clearly indicate that Design (D) 
failure modes quantitatively dominated flight incidents. 
was based on reported Problem/ Failure reports without the more  definitive 
data available for the other programs studied, so that a relatively high 
percentage (2170) of the flight incidents were classified Unknown (X). For  
that program i t  is  also notable that no flight failures could be attributed to 
Devices (G). 
Mariner experience 
The Biosatellite flight failure mode distribution presented in Table 4-1 and 
Figure 4-1 was split in two, based on the two phases of the program in 
which the 3- and 30-day flight spacecraft were developed and flown. 
failures of the former were thermistors which were overstressed in the 
sterilizing process due to their mounting arrangement in specimen bottles. 
Many were used due to the nature of the science experiments. The relatively 
high ratio of Design (D) failures in both program phases was due largely 
to interface problems caused by novel mission and payload requirements such 
a s  deorbit from random attitude and biological maintenance of a primate, 
respectively. 
Part 
Finally, note the high percentage (32%) of Nimbus part  failures (P), 
believed to result f rom the use of commercial parts on the program. 
This is 
Consideration of Table 4-1 and Figure 4-1 and the details f rom which they 
were developed, together with the qualifications noted immediately above 
reveal the following: 
a. Design failures persisted into flight operations to a major extent. 
b. 
ground test; for  example: 
Many of the design deficiencies uncovered in flight had been apparent in 
EM phenomena, Biosatellite, Mariner 
Tape Recorders, Nimbus 
False Commands, Lunar Orbiter, Biosatellite 
Camera Doors, Lunar Orbiter 
RF  Locks, Mariner 
Psychomoto r Tester,  Biosatellite 
4- 3 
c. 
necessarily reduce the incidence of flight anomalies (compare: Nimbus 
with 26 for 1 unit and Mariner with 33  with 2 units to Lunar Orbiter with 
51 in 5 flights and Biosatellite with 29 in 3 flights). 
Maturity expressed a s  a continuing ser ies  of flights does not 
4.2 Failure Modes in Ground Testing 
In addition to the determination of flight failure modes discussed in the 
preceding section, this study included the analysis of ground tes t  
failures of the same four programs. 
the following information: 
Addition of the latter provided 
e 
lingered to affect flight (a significant factor, a s  noted in Section 3). 
Indication of the extent to which problems encountered in ground tes t  
Q 
out latent defects. 
Determination of the effectiveness of the testing program in screening 
e 
in ground test. 
Appraisal of the adequacy of design fixes in solving problems arising 
e Additional background data relative to specific equipments. 
e 
more  accurate perspective of program problem areas. 
A l a rger  data base than available f rom flight to permit a broader and 
Processed details of ground test failure data were available for the Lunar 
Orbiter and Biosatellite Programs. 
vehicle logbooks augmented by contact with the responsible contractor sub- 
system engineers. The Mariner mater ia l  consisted of preliminary incident 
descriptions which were adequate in most cases  for  indicating failure causes. 
The failure descriptions from all these programs were studied with respect 
to equipment design and complexity (see Section 6) and to the nature of the 
tes t  program (see Section 7) and other project constraints in order  to assign 
failure modes to the ground tes t  incidents. 
Nimbus data was obtained from the 
4-4 
4.2.1 Relative Occurrence of Failure Modes 
Table 4-2 presents a summary of the ground test failure modes by percent 
for each program studied. 
is also listed in the bottom row. 
Table 4-1, with addition of the Test (T) failure mode which is here  applicable, 
and which in fact is the most repetitive. 
programs follow a generally similar pattern of distribution. 
The total number of applicable failures for each 
The format of this table is the same as 
Note that the failure modes for all 
The Nimbus ground tes t  failure mode distribution departs appreciably from 
the pattern of the other programs because this data includes system level 
assembly and testing only. 
was omitted f rom Table 4-2. 
For  this reason the Nimbus ground test  data 
The individual program failure mode distributions a r e  plotted in b a r  chart 
form in  Figure 4-2 except for Nimbus which was omitted for reasons ex- 
plained in  the preceding paragraph. 
satellite patterns presented in  Figure 4-2 a r e  very similar and typical of 
programs involving adaptations of previous experience a s  well as develop- 
ment of new concepts in  about equal degree. Interestingly these two pro- 
grams pursued closely related chronological paths. 
The Lunar Orbiter and 3-Day Bio- 
The relatively large percentage of the Part (P) failure mode for Mariner 69 
is believed to be due to the extensive use of integrated circuits. 
The relatively high percentage for the 30-Day Biosatellite Test  (T) mode is 
largely due to the difficulties in testing biological interfacing hardware. The 
fact that many of the process problems were solved in the previous 3-Day 
program phase accounts for the comparatively low level of the Manufacturing 
(M) mode. 
4.2.2 Failure Modes vs. Time 
Figures 4-3 through 4-7, inclusive, show the incidence of failuresby mode 
plotted against calendar time during the Project (dates were taken from 
failure report documents). 
all showing a trend towards leveling off a s  launch dates approach. 
case of Biosatellite 3-Day (Figure 4-5), the curve shows the least  leveling 
prior to flight, and this was the unit which failed to complete a mission. The 
3-Day Biosatellite covers the delivery of 2 flight units. The second unit was 
flown (with some modifications) in  September of 1967. Nimbus B (Figure 4-7) 
shows the effect of the 2 vehicles, with the leveling effect for the second unit 
somewhat less  than for the f i rs t ;  this effect has been attributed to the use of 
The shape of these curves a r e  generally similar, 
In the 
4- 5 
reworked hardware. 
normalizing process can be applied and a characteristic shape described for 
a program. 
characteristic can allow a real  time assessment of project status as data 
is received from test  operations. 
The common shape of these curves suggest that a 
Coupled with predictions for  totals of failure incidents, such a 
4 . 2 . 3  Failure Modes vs. Environment 
The obvious pattern disclosed by this study has bee9 the predominance of 
failures uncovered by functional testing under ambient conditions as 
indicated in Figure 4-8, wherein the failure distributions by environment 
are shown. 
manufacturing mistakes (mis-wiring, poor bonds, etc. ) do not need environ- 
mental inducements to inhibit operation. 
largely appeared during the functional operational phases prior to environ- 
mental exposures. 
thermal vacuum environments show about equal effect for uncovering 
failures and both appear to be effective screening concepts. 
This follows a deductive logic, in that many design deficiencies and 
Within the study, these failures 
In addition to the ambient conditions, vibration and 
4-6 
TABLE 4 - 1 SUMMARY OF FLIGHT FAILURE MODE DISTRIBUTIONS 
I 
k 
ORBITER 
IMER BIO ITE BIOS e 
9 30-DAY 
56% 40% 1 48% DESIGN 
MANUFACTURING M 
68% 
14% 6% 3% 6% 
PARTS P 17% 9% 20% 42% 32% 
DEVICES G 9% 0 6% 12% 13% 
NOT EXPLAINED X 
(UNKNOWN) 
2% 2 1% 0 0 4% 
TOTAL % 100% 
51 TOTAL NUMBER 
NUMBER OF 
FLIGHTS 5 
TABLE 4 - 2 SUMMARY OF GROUND TEST FAILURE MODE DISTRIBUTIONS 
LUNAR 
ORBITER 
BIOSATELLITE 
3-DAY 
BIOS .,
30-DAY 
MARINER 
'69 
25% 
FAILURE MODE 
35% DESIGN P 26% 34% 
15% 24% MANUFACTURING M 30,% 20% 
1% 1% PARTS P 4'% 12% 
6% 1% 1% 1% DEVICES G 
35 .% 26% 32% 45% TEST' T 
MISCELLANEOUS X 4 11% 7% 4% 
T o t a l  % 100% 100% 100% 100% 
15 14 T o t a l  Quantity 1059 483 1861 
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5.0 EXPENENCE APPLICABLE TO THE VIKING LANDER 
This section describes potential flight problems for the Viking Lander based 
upon the data f rom the four space projects in  this study. The problems a r e  
discussed in te rms  of failure mechanisms, causes, and effects. These data 
a r e  presented in  5 tables which a r e  listed below and described briefly in the 
following paragraphs. 
Table 5- 1 Interface Problems 
5 - 2  
5-3 Persistent Problems 
5 -4 Unique Incidents 
5-5 Extended Descriptions 
Experience with Advanced Hardware Proposed for 
the Viking Lander 
5. 1 Interface Problems 
A total of 9 interface problems a r e  presented in  Table 5-1. 
all had causes which originated in one component o r  subsystem and had 
effects elsewhere in  the spacecraft. 
were the end result  of a ser ies  of contributing causes o r  defects. 
ance of these problems within the Viking Lander would impair the ability to 
satisfy all the mission objectives. 
as follows: 
These problems 
In some cases  the observed incidents 
The appear- 
Within the table the problems are presented 
e The problem is described and supported by an illustrative example. 
e 
flight which was compromised. 
The impacts to the projects a r e  shown by number of incidents o r  the 
0 
of the flight work-around o r  similar action. 
The generating causes a r e  briefly identified and followed by a description 
0 
of principal concern. 
The application to the Viking Lander i s  shown by identifying the a rea  
0 References a r e  provided to the extended descriptions in  Table 5-5. 
5.2 Experience with Advanced Hardware Proposed for  the Viking Lander 
The experience from ground tes t  and flight f o r  9 types of spacecraft hardware 
a r e  presented in Table 5-2. 
For  each type of hardware the table describes: 
All  of these wil l  be employed in the Viking Lander. 
5-1 
0 
spacecraft. 
The suppliers, the flight spacecraft, and the functional use within the 
0 Ground tes t  problems, these a r e  listed showing causes, effects, and 
degree of repetition. 
0 
descriptions of the failure incidents. 
Flight experiences - these are shown as numbers of failures and 
The i tems described in  the table were the results of intensive development 
efforts within each of the projects. 
l e s s  than that being planned and applied to the hardware under development 
for the Viking Lander. 
continued and the problems described may have been resolved. 
tailoring these types of equipment to fit the exacting requirements imposed by 
the Viking Lander, i t  is important to appreciate what has occurred in past 
programs in  order  to avoid repetition of previous problems. 
The degree of effort expended was no 
For  the i tems listed, technology development has 
However, in 
5 . 3  Persis tent  Problems 
Some types of problems have appeared in  common and persistently to each of 
the projects i n  the study. Table 5-3 describes the 7 types of persistent pro- 
blems encountered. Evidence indicates that where these problems were not 
resolved in ground tests they persisted into flight and compromised mission 
objectives. Attention to these potential problems during design and tes t  can 
minimize their impacts upon both ground testing and ca r ry  over into flight. 
The persistent problem data a r e  presented as follows: 
0 
forms o r  occurrences. 
The problem is described in general and defined ,in te rms  of the principal 
0 Persistence is shown by number of incidents. 
0 
The descriptions are shown in relation to the principal concern o r  most 
probable appearance in  the Viking Lander. 
The causes and the resulting impact upon the projects a r e  described. 
5.4 Unique Incidents 
Tabie 5-4 presents 19 one-of-a-kind incidents which have a potential for 
occurrence in the Viking Lander. 
and in a number of cases they arose a s  a result of incorporating changes which 
These problems generally came as  surpr ises;  
5-2  
were intended to eliminate other problems. The table has been arranged 
into 5 groupings of incidents under the headings of power, noise, com- 
munications, devices, and parts-materials. For  each incident, the data 
a r e  presented as follows: 
0 
project of origin. 
The incident is described showing the causes, the effects, and the 
0 
identified. 
The similarity o r  potential for occurrence to the Viking Lander is 
0 
Viking Lander can avoid repetition. 
Supporting comments offer descriptions of the means by which the 
5. 5 Extended Descriptions 
Table 5-5 describes 10 a reas  in  which the data f rom the previous tables are 
expanded by extended descriptions; references to Table 5 -5 appear through- 
out the f i r s t  3 tables of this section. 
coupled with check-list information recommended to the Viking Lander 
Project. 
These extended descriptions a r e  
5-3 
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6.0 COMPARATIVE DESCRIPTION OF SPACECRAFT 
The mater ia l  presented in this section provides a summary description 
of the hardware and mission configurations of the programs in this study. 
This mater ia l  is provided, since differences in hardware and mission can be 
expected to effect the type and quantity of failure/anomalies. 
contains the following tables and figures: 
This section 
Table 6. 1 
6 . 2  
6 .3  
6.4 
Figure 6.1 
6 .2  
6.3 
6.4 
6.5 
Comparison of Missions 
Comparison of Components and Subsystems 
Comparison of Pa r t s  Count by Subsystems 
Summary Comparison of Five Spacecraft 
Block Diagram Lunar Orbiter 
Block Diagram Mariner 69 
Block Diagram Biosatellite 
Block Diagram Nimbus B 
Block Diagram Viking Lander (Preliminary) 
6.1 Comparison of Missions 
Table 6-1 presents the Viking Mission Phases alongside corresponding 
flight activities of the other spacecraft. 
principal events and constraints a r e  listed together with an estimate of the 
duty cycles and elapsed time envelopes for the mission duration. 
Lander can be seen to have the most complex mission, with total operating 
and flight times matched only by Nimbus B. 
For each mission phase, the 
The Viking 
6 , 2  Comparison of Subsystems 
Table 6 -2  presents the comparison of subsystems and components proposed 
for the Viking Lander with similar items for the other programs. 
extent possible the arrangement i s  by subsystems or equipment groupings 
which essentially accomplish the same functions within their  respective 
spacecraft. 
known similarities to proposed Viking Lander equipment a r e  identified. 
The following comments bring attention to items of special interest  in 
Table 6-2. 
To the 
Component assembly i tems in  the programs studied which have 
Except for Viking and Biosatellite, thermal control of these spacecraft was 
limited to passive or semi-passive radiative elements. Biosatellite con- 
tained a sophisticated heat transfer subsystem consisting of a circulating 
fluid, heat exchangers, and differential displacement valves which absorbed 
6-  1 
heat f rom some elements, surrendered i t  to others, and radiated the excess 
externally with both a radiator and a water boiler. 
used thermostatically controlled electrical heaters  for  short duration needs, 
as in conditioning dormant components such a s  gyros, IR scanners, etc. 
All  spacecraft studied 
The Biosatellite communication equipment consisted of VHF beacon, 
receivers,  and transmitters with a data ra te  of 22,4 K bps. 
transmitted in  real  time except the outputs of three shift registers and a 
recovered tape recorder. 
direct communications links. 
l em of transmission delay (about 40 minutes round t r ip  for Viking). 
Al l  data was 
The other spacecraft all employ an S-Band for 
Viking and Mariner share the additional prob- 
Lunar Orbiter, Mariner, and Nimbus employ solar cells a s  the basic power 
source. 
into power with water as a by-product; the oxygen and hydrogen were stored 
cyrogenically. The Viking Lander will employ a SNAP 19 RTG, of the same 
type now flying a s  an experiment on Nimbus B. 
Biosatellite used a fuel cell which converted oxygen and hydrogen 
Al l  the four spacecraft utilized gyro sensing rate  control, maintaining a 
fixed attitude through either infrared sensors o r  s ta r  trackers.  
control employed jetted cold gas which for  Nimbus supplemented inertia 
wheel fine control. By comparison the preliminary approach for  Viking 
Lander attitude control will employ a pulsed hot gas  reaction system supported 
by rate sensing from gyros. 
Active 
6.3 Comparison of Pa r t  Counts 
Table 6-3 presents an electronic parts count by subsystem and part  type of 
each spacecraft. The Viking Lander counts a r e  based on the best  estimates 
available a t  the date of publication. It i s  realized that since integrated c i r -  
cuits and MSI a r e  counted as parts,  total parts count is not an accurate 
measure of equipment complexity; however, this information is generally 
provided in technical descriptions. 
In order  to provide circuit complexity comparisons an "equivalent discrete 
parts" count is listed in Table In computing the equivalent 
total parts,  the total number of discrete parts within an integrated circuit 
o r  MSI is counted, rather than counting the IC o r  MSI as one part. 
6-4. 
For hardware complexity comparison, the numbers of part connections for 
each spacecraft a r e  listed in Table 6-4, 
has 2 connections, a transistor has 3, and a typical integrated circuit has 14. 
For  example, a res is tor  
6-2  
6.4 General Comparisons of Other Spacecraft with Viking Lander 
The Viking Lander i s  expected to weigh about twice a s  much as Nimbus o r  
Biosatellite and about three times as much as Mariner o r  Lunar Orbiter 
(see Table 6-4). 
of flight, and so must have the self-contained capability to ca r ry  out its 
functions (which a r e  considerably more varied and complex); like Bio- 
satellite, it will enter (with a much longer entry into an unfamiliar environ- 
ment and with the requirement for precise alignment); like Lunar Orbiter, 
it will deploy complex mechanisms; like Nimbus, i t  will perform a number 
of dissimilar experiments (but of greater  intricacy and involving laboratory 
type devices). Uniquely Viking has three unprecedented novel constraints: 
the sterilization requirement, the extensive and intricate science program, 
and the scope of the planetary entry program, 
Like Mariner, i t  will experience long delay in signal time 
Based on the several  electrical parts counts shown in Table 6-3, the Viking 
Lander design complexity is projected a s  3 to 4 t imes that of Mariner 69, 
which was sizeable in itself. Since the latter benefitted considerably from 
prior program experience, development of the Viking Lander is clearly an 
unprecedented task for  an unmanned space unit. 
complexity is the wide variety of electromechanical elements such a s  the 
RTG, thermal switch, soil sampler, terminal descent engine, and the science 
experiments. 
never been done, performance of a major exploratory mission after extended 
dormancy and planetary entry. 
, 
In addition to the electronic 
Furthermore,  the Viking Lander must accomplish what has 
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TABLE 6-4 SUMMARY COMPARISON OF FIVE SPACECRAFT 
Weight Dry 
Weight To ta l  
No. Subsys t e m s  
No, Science Experiments 
T o t a l  Discrete P a r t s  
(1) 
Number of Mic roc i r cu i t s  
Equivalent Discrete 
P a r t s  (2) 
Number o f  P a r t  
Connections 
Number of Months From 
Program S t a r t  t o  F i r s t  
F l i g h t  
Primary Mission - 
Months 
B l igh t  Duration of  
To ta l  F l i g h t  Duration 
Configurat ions 
Qual i f ied  a t  t h e  
Component Level  
Component Assemblies 
Bu i l t  
Ind iv idua l  Tes t  
Exposures 
VIKING 
LANDER 
2350# 
2650# 
12 
12 
33,729 
9,470 
162,907 
68,480 
72 
17 
E s t .  88 
653 
2010 
LUNAR 
ORBITER 
5 7 8# 
85311 
7 
4 
19,811 
771 
38,315 
54,898 
29 
1 - Primary 
12 - Limitec 
74-339 Days 
28 
420 
1396 
MARINER 
82 If 
850# 
17 
4 
21,595 
2,678 
85,867 
79,169 
37 
5 
9 Months 
52 
360 
1020 
BIOSATELLITE 
1380# 
1530# 
12 
6 
8,660 
508 
0,852 
!5,799 
33 
1 
8 Days (Experi- 
45 Days (Engrg. 
ment) 
S I S )  
155 
946 
2312 
NIMBUS 
12499 
1269# 
14 
9 
23,047 
84 
25 , 063 
61,112 
N/A 
12 
18 Mos. 
53 
No Data 
No Data 
(1) Includes mic roc i r cu i t s  (2) Includes a count of 25 f o r  each mic roc i r cu i t  
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7.0 COMPARATIVE DESCRIPTION O F  TEST PROGRAMS 
The material  presented in this section provides detailed tabular summary 
description of the ground test programs in the four space projects in this 
study. In addition, the data presented has been evaluated against the re-  
sulting space flight performance for  each of the space programs. 
This material  .is provided since the types and levels of testing can be ex- 
pected to effect the type and quantity of flight failure Pnomalies. 
section contains the following tables and figures: 
This 
Table 7-1 
7-2 
7-3 
7-4 
Figure 7-1 
7-2 
7-3 
7-4 
7-5 
7-6 
Component Environmental Tests 
System Environmental Tests 
Summary of Test  Program Evaluation Criteria 
Summary of Flight Acceptance Test Exposure 
Block Diagram of Hardware Utilization, Lunar Orbiter 
Block Diagram of Hardware Utilization, Mariner 69 
Block Diagram of Hardware Utilization, Biosatellite 
Block Diagram of Hardware Utilization, Nimbus B 
Block Diagram of Hardware Utilization, Viking Lander 
Comparison of Hardware Failures in Time 
For each of the programs in the study, Section 7. 1 provides a review of the 
test  opportunities, environmental exposcres, and test problems in conjunction 
with the flight problems shown in Section 3. 
use in establishing o r  evaluating future t e s t  programs. 
extracted f rom the reviews presented in Section 7.1 and test  related data 
appearing in sections 4 and 5. 
Section 7.2 defines cr i ter ia  f o r  
These cr i ter ia  a r e  
7. 1 Evaluation of the Test Programs in the Study 
An evaluation of each test  program i s  presented in paragraphs 7.1.1 through 
7.1.4 below, with the discussions organized as follows: 
A. Opportunity for Test  - Comments describe completeness in provisions 
for uncovering or detecting potential flight problems. 
block diagrams, which show the project utilization of hardware sets,  types 
of testing and sequences employed. 
The basic data a r e  the 
B. 
environments appearing in Tables 7-1 and 7-2. 
contained in the tables include the exposures applied to both components and 
spacecraft for conditions of qualification, flight acceptance, and special 
demonstrations. 
Environments - Describes the deviations from the baseline tes t  program 
The test levels and durations 
7- 1 
C. 
of the test program. 
outlined in the block diagrams. 
Test  Problems - Identification of difficulties encountered in performance 
These problems tended to compromise the test  programs 
D. 
of section 3) for  which ground testing had been provided, but the applied tests 
did not uncover the problem. These incidents a r e  described in context with 
the tes t  program and the applied environments. 
Undetected by Ground Test - Identifies flight failures (from the tables 
7.1.1 LUNAR ORBITER (Figure 7-1 and Tables) 
A. Opportunity for Test  - The project employed a thorough ground test  
program with extensive component testing leading up to ground tes t  of a com- 
plete spacecraft. 
completed, and in addition, at the t ime of f i r s t  flight the component acceptance 
testing for the remaining spacecraft equipment was also completed. The early 
completion of component and most spacecraft testing resulted in early recog- 
nition of operating problems. 
The ground testing planned to precede the f i r s t  flight was 
B. 
tables except for specific i tems as follows: 
Environments - The environment exposures followed those defined in  the 
Photo Subsystem: The photo subsystem was treated as a special case. 
components contained within the subsystem assembly were not individually 
subjected to qualification o r  flight acceptance; instead, the subsystem was 
tested a s  a whole. 
were conducted at spacecraft rather than component environmental levels 
(see Table 7-2). 
Most 
In addition, the sine vibration tes ts  for the photo subsystem 
Component Vibration: A vibration test  of a spacecraft assembly was performed 
prior to component design completion. Data f rom this test was used as a basis 
to reduce vibration levels a s  follows: Component Sine Vibration: Input levels 
were revised downward for 10 components which included the transponder, 
inertial  reference unit and the traveling wave tube amplifier. 
Random Vibration: Spectrum adjustments and level reductions as much as 
35 percent were allowed to 12  components in the communications and propulsion 
subsystems. 
Component 
C. 
photo subystem assemblies. Spacecraft tests at the factory were not able to 
employ flight photo subsystems and the use of simulators did not necessarily 
provide appropriate system interface exposures. The flight photo subsystems 
received flight acceptance testing in  the subcontractor plant and were installed 
in the spacecraft at the launch site for  subsequent functional tes ts  as pa r t  of the 
pre -launch preparation. 
Test  Problems - The tes t  problems stemmed from the slow delivery of the 
7-2  
D. 
which were undetected by ground tests provided for their control. 
incidents which either resulted in loss of data o r  tedious flight operations 
work - arounds we r e  : 
Undetected by Ground Test - The records from flight show 13 incidents 
The 
1. 
ist ics deteriorated in space, and required operation of the spacecraft pitched 
"off sun". 
cause measurements of emissivity were made before and after, but not during 
the solar vacuum environment. 
Thermal Paint Degradation (LO-1-2) - The thermal emissivity character-  
The tes t  of the thermal paint did not detect the deterioration be- 
2. Photo Subsystem EM1 Problem (LO-1-8) - An unexpected transient pulse 
effect smeared all of the high resolution image motion compensated telephoto 
pictures during the f i r s t  flight. 
interest. During photo subsystem tests and testing at the ETR, no integrated 
operations were performed which would have detected this failure mode. This 
problem was corrected by a redesign and verified by test before the second 
flight. 
The high resolution photos were of primary 
3. Mechanisms Degradation - Several mechanisms degraded in flight. The 
Readout Scanner cam did not return to Itspot stop" position sporadically through- 
out the mission (LO-11-3); backup commands overcame the problem with m h o r  
loss of readout time. 
sporadically with no commands given (LO-IV-2 and LO-IV-5); work-arounds 
controlled the problem until the failure became complete, which resulted in a 
10 percent loss of photos. A camera shutter sustained double t r ip  which lost 
one photo (LO-IV-4). The deterioration of these mechanisms was potentially 
due to either wear o r  launch vibration; design changes provided increased 
resistance to both effects. 
The Readout Scanner Encoder terminated readout 
7.1.2 MARINER '69 (Figure 7-2 and Table) 
A. 
approach as that successfully used for  Mariner '64 to establish the quantities of 
hardware, and flow of test operations. 
assembled spacecraft was achieved by installing prototype subsystems and com- 
ponents into the proof test  model (Qualification Unit). This action generated 
some extra problem failure reports,however, operating problems were thus 
identified and resolved early. 
Opportunity for Test  - The Mariner '69 test program employed the same 
For  Mariner '69, early operation of an 
B. 
data f rom Mariner '64 was used to reduce testing. 
described in Table 7- 1 were subject to the following interpretatcons and modifi- 
cations : 
Environments - In the environmental qualifications of subsystems,applicable 
The environmental exposures 
7-3 
1. Sine Vibration: Local resonance conditions were superimposed upon the 
sweeps; input force levels reached as much as 2 times nominal over frequency 
bands of 100 Hz. 
2. 
only (antennas, s ta r  trackers).  
Acoustic Testing: Testing of subassemblies was limited to exterior items 
3. Transportation Vibration and Bench Handling Shock: Applied to pyrotechnic 
devices only. 
4. Pyro Shock: Applied to science and close proximity equipment (6 items) 
5. Humidity: New equipment only (18 items). 
6. Explosive Atmosphere: Applied to items operating with high voltages (6). 
7. Electron-Proton Radiation: Waived in all cases. 
C. 
3 separate sources. 
were both considered in the setting of interfaces and final use of equipment. 
double mission use necessitated designing for  wider dynamic ranges in regulators 
and wider acceptance of signals through interfaces. The spacecraft was more  
sensitive to some types of disturbances such as EM1 pulse transients. The double 
mission used also restricted quantity of spacecraft hardware available for test  
purposes only. The spares from the ' 6 9  project were allocated to the '71 project. 
Late deliveries relative to the inflexible launch date compromised the life testing 
of equipment. Only 
15 were begun and 4 completed. 
upwards from 500 hours. 
project and the one which caused the most difficulty to testing was associated 
with microcircuits. 
sophistication employed, apparently taxed the capabilities of the suppliers 
to deliver in both the quantities and quality required. 
microcircuit  modules continued throughout the test program and extended into 
the final phases of launch preparation. 
Test  Problems - The tes t  problems encountered by Mariner '69 came from 
Firs t ,  in design, the Mariner '69 and Mariner '71 missions 
The 
Life tests of 7000 hours duration were planned for 25 items. 
The principal problem experienced by the entire 
The uncompleted tests had exposure t imes ranging 
The introduction of microcircuits to the degree and 
The change-out of 
D. 
incidents which ground testing failed to identify. 
-- Undetected in Ground Test  - The Mariner data f rom flight shows four 
Of these, 2 were manu- 
facturing defects, and 2 were EM1 effects. 
a s  follows: 
The problems a r e  described 
1. Reversed Polarity (Manufacturing): The reversed thermal sensor was not 
detected during space simulation thermal vacuum tests. 
7 -4 
2. Wiring E r r o r  (Manufacturing): This problem was not discovered during 
ambient o r  environmental spacecraft tes ts ,  
not say, but it is possible the wiring e r r o r  was in a module changed late during 
flight preparation. 
The available information does 
3. 
Table 5-1. 
this problem. 
platform movement were observed only when AGE cabling was attached. 
ever, the problem appeared in  flight. 
tinued in  anticipation of more  sensitive equipment to be used in the '71 flight. 
EM1 Noise over Portions of the IRR Scan: This incident is described in 
The Mariner records show 3 problem/failure reports dealing with 
How- 
In ground testing the variances in IRR data Curing the scan 
The investigation of the problem has con- 
7 . 1 . 3  BIOSATELLITE (Figure 7 - 3  and Table) 
A. Opportunities for Test  - The original concept for the Biosatellite project 
called for 3 separate flight missions. The f i rs t ,  of 3 days duration, carr ied 
general biology experiments; the second, of 30 days duration, carr ied a live 
primate; and the last, of 21 days duration, was to have carried live rats  and 
special plants (the 21 day spacecraft was never built). 
figurations common equipment was to be used to the maximum extent. Space 
proven hardware in current ser ies  production was also to be employed to the 
maximum extent. 
from Discoverer, fuel cells  from Gemini and a command subsystem which had 
been flown in  4 previous applications. 
In all 3 spacecraft con- 
These latter items included recovery and de-orbit components 
Each of the Biosatellite flight missions was preceded by a thorough test  program. 
Subsystem operations were verified as breadboards employing prototype com- 
ponents. These components were subsequently assembled to produce an early 
spacecraft. Throughout the program, components common between missions 
were shared in the assembly of the ear ly  spacecraft. 
mission had extra complexity due to the life support interface. 
the special interfaces with the primate required an additional spacecraft assembly 
(spacecraft 601). These data from early tests provided a base for performing the 
acceptance and qualification of the particular spacecraft fabricated for  the 
missions. 
flight spacecraft. 
The primate (30 day) 
The testing for 
Each of the 2 configurations built included a qualification unit and 2 
B. Environments - The environmental testing for all spacecraft components 
applied the conditions associated with the 30 day flight. 
mission the environments described in Table 7-1 included 2 limited applications: 
Within the 30 day 
1. 
port subsystem and portions of the life support equipment. 
Sterilization: This environment was only applied to items in the urine t rans-  
2. 
recovery capsule (equipment in contact with the primate). 
Fungus: This environment was only applied to equipment located in the 
7 - 5  
C. 
compromises. In design,the multiple use of components and the use of existing 
flight equipment generated problems with interfaces. 
failure incidents a rose  from interface problems and some of the problems per- 
sisted into flight. 
and requalification effort. 
was added a s  an environment in  flight acceptance testing of components. 
existing flight equipment was recycled to include tes t  of the additional exposure. 
Test  Problems - The tes t  program for Biosatellite suffered a ser ies  of 
A large segment of the 
The failure to recover the first flight initiated a redesign 
As a consequence of the failure, thermal vacuum 
Al l  
The difficulties introduced by the primate mission resulted in continuing changes 
in the flight spacecraft relative to the qualification and development units. Prob- 
lems  associated with the primate necessitated a major redesign of the psycho- 
motor game and the urine transport  equipment just before the flight spacecraft 
was due for shipment to the launch site. 
was limited only to flight acceptances a s  components and indirectly through the 
flight acceptance test  of the spacecraft. 
ification levels were not applied. 
Testing of the redesigned equipment 
The proofing environments at qual- 
D. 
spacecraft show 7 incidents which were not discovered by the intended ground 
test. 
Undetected in Ground Test - The records from the flights of Biosatellite 
These problems a r e  described as follows: 
1. Reversed Polarities: These problems total 3 incidents involving T t g T T  
switches and the outputs of command receivers. 
in Table 5-1 and 5. 5.8. 
These a r e  discussed in  detail 
2. 
precluded exhaustive ground testing. 
most probably would have appeared in  further ground testing. 
Psychomotor Game - Food Dispenser: The late redesign of the game unit 
Flight records indicate 3 incidents which 
3 .  Transmitter-Receiver Overlap: This incident occurred during the first 
flight and a discussion of the details indicates a type of problem which could 
appear with future testing or test  equipment, 
telemetry transmitters and command receivers provided for ample margins 
of isolation, although the receiver showed sensitivities 6 to 7 db below the 
specification threshold. However, the 7000 Hz frequency associated with the 
decoder address word turned out to be a harmonic of the 1792 bits per second 
telemetry rate. 
bits to enter the receiver and become intermixed with the digital address for 
the command decoders. 
did not accept the commands. 
The designs of the Biosatellite 
The presence of the harmonic was sufficient to allow telemetry 
The spurious bits changed the addresses,  the decoders 
During flight command access was difficult. 
Ground tests with either commands or telemetry separately operated without 
difficulty. 
occasional problems with command access. 
Combined operation with air link RF  transmissions showed 
On many previous projects using 
7-6  
similar equipment in the same facility,air link transmission had always 
shown problems generally traceable to either the facility o r  the ground test  
equipment. 
attributed to sources other than the spacecraft. 
Consequently the command link problems during tes t  were 
7.1.4 NIMBUS B (Figure 7-4 and Table) 
A. 
treated a s  additional assemblies in a ser ies  of like spacecraft. Changes in 
equipment were relatively minor and had a minimum effect upon interfaces. 
Opportunities for Test  - The testing of the Nimbus B spacecraft was 
B. 
the exposure levels and test  sequences. 
craft,the environmental exposures were reduced in number of environments but 
increased in the levels and duration of exposures. 
Environments - The experience from the f i r s t  2 flights were factored into 
In comparison to ear l ier  Nimbus space- 
1. 
spacecraft. 
manner similar to Mariner '69. 
over frequency bands of 100 Hz. 
Vibration: Levels were approximately 2 times those applied to the early 
In additionsthe sinusoidal sweeps simulated local resonances in a 
The local increases  reached 2.5 t imes nominal 
2. 
Nimbus flight and could be traced to a thermal vacuum induced cause. 
sequent testing was therefore increased in both duration and temperature l imits 
for thermal cycling. Flight acceptance of Nimbus equipment totaled more than 
500 hours exposure to temperature cycling in hard vacuum. 
Thermal Vacuum: A solar panel bearing failure terminated the first 
Sub- 
C. 
t w o  s o u  r c e s . Commercial grade electrical parts were used in portions of 
the spacecraft; parts failures in flight comprise the largest  single group of 
significant failure/anomaly incidents, 
from a booster failure. 
unit of the Nimbus B project. 
of reworked qualification items and the spares  f rom the f i r s t  unit. 
Test  Problems - The testing of the Nimbus B project was compromised from 
The first Nimbus B spacecraft was lost  
The spacecraft flying as Nimbus I11 was the second 
This spacecraft was fabricated by using a number 
D. 
incident which escaped ground test. 
developed an intermittent contact after approximately 500 hours in flight. 
The capacitor was structurally unrestrained and supported only by the electrical 
leads and solder joints. The condition was a design and manufacturing oversight 
which escaped the pre-flight acceptance vibration and thermal vacuum exposures 
intended to uncover such deficiencies. 
Undetected in Ground Test - The Nimbus flight records show only one 
A capacitor in the S-band transmitter 
7 - 7  
7.2 Summary of Test  Related Experiences 
Facets of ground testing have been described throughout this report. Section 4 
presents data showing failures relative to the applied environments (see Figure 
4-8 and paragraph 4.2.3). 
testing, and Section 7 herein presents an evaluation of the test programs for 
each project. 
the establishment and evaluation of new test  programs. 
as Table 7-3 and a r e  grouped a s  follows: 
Section 5 shows the persistent problems related to 
From these data, cr i ter ia  emerge which can be employed in both 
These cr i ter ia  appear 
2.  
enhanced their projects by either uncovering operating problems at an early 
tirne or reducing the scope of la te r  testing. 
Early identification of operating problems - These test  program features 
2. 
margins against the potential contingencies associated with unknown or un- 
expected flight conditions. 
Establishment of Operating Margins - These features provided operating 
3. 
either diminished the value of ear ly  testing o r  contributed to flight anomalies. 
Test  Problems - Conditions present or occurring within a project which 
4. 
programs. 
the tes t  exposure levels applied for  flight acceptance. 
Environments - These environments had exposures applying to all the 
These data a r e  further expanded in  Table 7-4 which summarizes 
7.3 Comparison of Failures Occurring in Project Time 
Figure 7-6 shows a comparison of hardware failures as they occurred through- 
out the ground test  and flight phases for 3 of the projects in  the study. 
t ime scale has been normalized into percent of the ground test  phase preceding 
the f i r s t  flight. 
of the qualification components The ground tes t  phase includes qualifications, 
flight acceptances, and any special demonstrations which were performed con- 
currently. Failures a r e  shown as percent of the total occurring in both ground 
tes t  and flight. 
facturing, parts and devices. 
The 
For  each project, the time begins with the acceptance testing 
These include all incidents due to sources in  design, manu- 
The relative rates at which problems were uncovered by ground testing is 
similar for each of the 3 projects, although the test programs had different 
schedules and quantities of equipment. 
f rom the others a t  the time of f i r s t  flight since 3 additional spacecraft were 
still in ground test. 
satellite culminated with a single launch opportunity. 
Lunar Orbiter showed a difference 
On the other hand, ground testing for Mariner and Bio- 
7 - 8  
The idealized curve represents a goal for test  planning and project 
scheduling. 
to complete any necessary reworks and retests. 
can then proceed more  smoothly, and with less  potential for  failures to 
ca r ry  over into flight. 
have been identified which could help to bring future programs closer to the 
ideal. 
The early identification of problems allows more  ample time 
The final phases of testing 
Within each of the projects, test  program features 
These features are part  of the cr i ter ia  presented in Table 7-3 .  
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8.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This repor t  provides data and correlat ions f rom the experience of the 
four space programs studied. 
of features  re la ted to the Viking Lander, and the repor t  is offered to 
support  decision making for  that program. However, the ma te r i a l  herein 
should prove useful fo r  space programs in  general. 
These programs were  selected because 
The problem descriptions in  this repor t  can be used to develop check l i s t  
i t ems  fo r  design, manufacture, quality, test ,  and operations;  however, 
i t  is not believed possible to develop a l i s t  of ru les  which would a s s u r e  
program success.  
support the trade-offs among reliability, schedule, cost, weight, and 
function which a r e  necessary  a t  each step in  a space program. 
this understanding that general  conclusions and recommendations a r e  
presented in  Table 8-1. 
observations f rom flight experience data: 
The potential value of the ma te r i a l  in  this repor t  is to 
It is with 
Par t icu lar  attention i s  drawn to the following 
o 53% of flight fa i lures  were caused by design weakness. 
0 3870 of flight fa i lures  had occurred  previously during ground testing. 
In each case  the potential fa i lure  was considered to be an acceptable r i sk  
a s  to chance and consequence of occurrence.  
able pat tern of not recognizing potential flight fa i lures .  
This represents  an undesir-  
0 2470 of flight fa i lures  were new effects which had not occur red  previously. 
These fa i lures  showed the need for  design margins  in  the spacecraf t  and m o r e  
rea l i s t ic  simulation in test. 
0 
known and ground t e s t s  had been provided for  their  detection. I t  could be 
concluded that these t e s t s  were not adequate to demonstrate the required 
functional/environmental capability. 
1870 of flight fa i lures  escaped the i r  ground test .  The fai lure  cause was 
e 
exposures were  effective, however not sufficiently complete. 
1070 of flight fa i lures  were attr ibuted to environments encountered 
dur,ing the mission. I t  can be concluded that the ground tes t  environmental 
(Note: These items a r e  not mutually exclusive, and therefore  can add to 
m o r e  than 10070. ) 
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TABLE 8-1 STUDY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
SIGNIFICANT OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. FLIGHT FAILURES 
1. W e l l  established parts, materials, and 
processes - standard r i sks  - 
a. Par ts  
Problems can be expected with 
single source par ts ,  par t icular ly  
multifunctional i t e m s  such as 
integrated c i rcu i t s .  These 
require extensive development and 
are prone t o  processing quirks 
which can be veiled i n  
proprietary technology. Examples 
are i n  the microcircuits ex- 
periences with Lunar Orbiter and 
Mariner. 
b. Potentiometers 
Wire wound potentiometers are 
highly susceptible t o  localized 
w e a r  and contamination which re- 
s u l t s  i n  e r r a t i c  output. This 
condition a l so  applies t o  
potentiometric elements used i n  
transducers, posit ion feedback 
elements, pickoffs, c i r cu i t  
adjustments, etc. 
c. Solder Joints  
Poor solder jo in ts  have been a 
pers is tent  source of fa i lures .  
They were the more l ike ly  
candidate cause of the Nimbus 
S-Band transmitter fa i lure  and 
the fa i lure  of Biosatel l i te  t o  
deorbit . 
a. Par ts  
For spacecraft projects which do 
not have f lexible  schedules, single- 
source par ts  should be avoided. 
addition Procurement and Specification 
controls must be closely managed. 
In  
b. Potentiometers 
Inductive pickoffs avoid the problems 
inherent with potentiometers. How- 
ever wherever potentiometric i t e m s  
are employed, the application must be 
careful ly  evaluated f o r  the impact of 
these known problem areas. 
c. Solder Joints  
It should be required and ver i f ied 
tha t  a l l  electrical  connections be 
mechanically secured before soldering. 
For connectors, where t h i s  cannot be 
done, stresses on the jo in ts  should 
be relieved before encapsulation. 
Cable bends should be formed before 
lacing. 
Design review should extend t o  cover 
these items and include ver i f icat ion 
of the mock ups used fo r  harness 
routing a 
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TABLE 8-1 STUDY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
SIGNIFICANT OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
2. 
3. 
4 .  
Flight Failures with a Previous 
History i n  Ground T e s t  
The most frequent f l i g h t  fa i lures  
and the cause of nearly half of 
f l i g h t  data loss were incidents 
which had a previous his tory i n  
ground test operations. These 
were considered as acceptable r i sks  
a t  the t i m e  of launch. The sources 
of these incidents are e i ther  advanced 
hardware configured fo r - the  par t icular  
spacecraft o r  system. operating 
problems 
Examples - Rate Gyros, Tape 
Recorders - EM1 Sens i t iv i t ies  
Flight Failures without Precedent 
Flight fa i lures  from new ef fec ts  
included untried spacecraft 
equipment such as star trackers;  
new environments encountered such 
as unexpected RF f ie lds ;  and 
unprecedented loss of contact o r  
control of a spacecraft. Each 
mission has encountered new ef fec ts  
i n  the course of f l igh t .  
Flight Failures Which Escaped 
Detection by the Intended Ground 
Tests 
These fa i lures  show 4 general sources: 
1) Incomplete environmental exposures. 
2) Manufacturing defects which were 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  detect ,  o r  w e r e  
introduced by change. 
3) Defects which would have occurred 
i n  more prolonged tests, 
4 )  Defects o r  conditions masked by 
equipment o r  the operating environ- 
ment. The latter of t h i s  i s  the 
most d i f f i c u l t  t o  overcome. Available 
data  and experience often points t o  
sources outside the spacecraft. 
2. 
3. 
4 .  
(Cont d e ) 
RECOMMENDAT IONS 
Problem areas uncovered by ground 
tests need t o  be resolved more 
conclusively than has been done i n  
past  space programs. The material 
presented i n  Section 5 ident i f ies  
potent ia l  problems which can 
reasonably be expected t o  impact a 
major space program and which merit 
special  a t tent ion from the outset  of 
a new project. 
i s  needed i n  the evaluation of test 
"anomalies" and "recurrent glitches" 
which may s ignify fundamental 
operational weakness. A thorough 
review of re-design, re-work and re- 
test f o r  llre-qualification" and 
f l i g h t  acceptance i s  a l so  necessary. 
A par t icular  emphasis 
An approach toward circumventing such 
incidents i s  through f a i lu re  mode and 
ef fec ts  analyses performed i n  depth 
ear ly  i n  the design phase by multi- 
discipl inary teams. The team should 
analyze f o r  unexpected f l i g h t  events 
such as thermal variations,  RF 
interferences, etc. These analyses can 
provide the basis f o r  establishing the 
desired margins and potent ia l  work 
arounds fo r  the spacecraft and mission 
operations. 
Elimination o r  reduction of t h i s  class 
of f a i lu re  requires e f fo r t  i n  the 
f ollawing areas ; 
Detail review of environmental 
levels coupled with provision for  
extended or margin testing. 
Detail review of simulation required 
and method of achieving, par t icu lar ly  
f o r  disturbance sources originating 
outside the spacecraft. 
Presume tha t  the f a i lu re  originates 
i n  the spacecraft u n t i l  conclusive 
data ident i f ies  an external origin. 
Control of retest associated with 
replacement of components during 
the course of a test. 
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TABLE 8- 1 STUDY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Contd . ) 
- SIGNIFICANT OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
HARDWARE FAILURES ANI) CAUSES 
1. Tape Recorders 
Long t e r m  operation of tape 
recorders has been d i f f i cu l t .  
Problems have included: - Head contamination - Flut ter  - Drive mechanisms - Control - Tape s t a b i l i t y  against ageing, 
temperature and humidity 
2. Rate gyros 
The gyros used on these space 
programs have a number of inherent 
f a i lu re  mechanisms such as f lu id  
contamination, outgassing, bearing 
f r ic t ion ,  and dimensional changes. 
There are techniques f o r  eliminating 
o r  minimizing each of these, but the 
improvements tend t o  introduce n e w  
problems. 
3. Vibration Sensi t ivi ty  
A l l  four spacecraft have shown 
ef fec ts  of dynamic sensi t ivi ty .  
These involved inadequate attachment, 
overstress due to  resonance, etc. 
4. Corona and Arcing 
High voltage breakdown due t o  
arcing o r  corona have occurred o r  
threatened a l l  four spacecraft. 
RECOMMENDAT IONS 
1, Note the experience de ta i l s  i n  
Table 5-5.5, including solutions t o  
the problems . 
2. The gyro design fo r  a new program 
should be careful ly  studied to 
determine how the known prevalent 
f a i lu re  mechanisms have been 
minimized. 
3. Perform exploratory model surveys of 
spacecraft s t ruc tura l  response a t  
component mounting locations t o  define 
t ransmissibi l i ty  at  a t i m e  during the 
project suf f ic ien t ly  ear ly  t o  a id  
the design of components. 
4. A design review should consider 
these e f fec ts  and tests should be 
performed i n  deep space vacuum to the 
maximum extent possible. Do not 
assume "sealed" components are i n  f a c t  
sealed. Evaluate possible e f fec ts  of 
in te rna l  outgassing very thoroughly. 
5. Ringing and Oscillations 5. Testing must include operation a t  
These have been a pers is tent  source 
of fa i lures .  
components, e f fec ts  across interfaces 
and loop s t ab i l i t i e s .  The presence of subsystems, and system. 
beat frequencies and harmonics have 
circumvented redundancies and eliminated 
i so la t ion  margins to  the extent of 
s ignif icant  fa i lures  i n  f l igh t .  
extremes of voltage and s ignal  levels 
with documented resu l t s  ear ly  i n  the 
development phase of components, 
They include e f fec ts  within 
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TABLE 8-1 STUDY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Contd.) 
SIGNIFICANT OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS RECOMMENDAT IONS 
6 .  Interface Compatibility 6 .  Noise reject ion criteria should be 
Signals across interface between 
components have been a pers is tant  
problem area. These problems arise 
when spurious b i t s ,  pulses and 
transients are accepted in to  the 
main s ignal  stream. Component 
noise re ject ion cr i ter ia  were not 
adequately specified i n  these 
prograns . 
adequately specified and demonstrated 
i n  new programs. 
C. 
7. Po lar i ty  reversals have caused 
major problems i n  f l i g h t  and 
delays i n  test. 
8. Pyrotechnically in i t i a t ed  devices 
are sensi t ive t o  re la t ive ly  s m a l l  
changes i n  the pyro charge which 
occur during resizing or  process 
changes e 
TESTING CONSIDERATIONS 
1. EM1 
EM1 control has been d i f f i cu l t .  
A l l  projects followed present 
specifications toward establishing 
a 6 db margin, however EM1 problems 
have persisted in to  f l igh t .  
2. T e s t  Procedures 
Complex test setups and lengthy 
procedures caused test problems 
and delays. 
7. Specific responsibi l i ty  and 
procedures should be assigned t o  
ver i fy  polar i r ies  i n  f l i g h t  equipment, 
test setups a t  design reviews and test 
data reviews. 
8. Verify sat isfactory operation of 
pyrotechnically in i t i a t ed  devices, 
under extreme conditions (w) of 
in i t ia t ion .  
1. EM1 
1) The use of 12 db margin i s  
suggested. 
2) An EM1 design review would be 
helpful i n  reducing the problem. 
3) It is  desirable t o  i n s t i t u t e  a high 
level EM1 review board, andassign 
design analysts t o  explore the 
problem i n  depth. 
4 )  Specifications should be def ini t ized 
f o r  components and interfaces 
across subsystems t o  prescribe EM1 
controls and ver i f ica t ion  tests. 
2. Test Procedures 
It i s  desirable t o  limit the scope of 
individual tests t o  facil itate their 
conduct and controls. Procedures review 
and control must be given more at tent ion 
fo r  complex systems testing. 
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TABLE 8-1 STUDY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Concluded) 
SIGNIFICANT OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
FLIGHT OPERATIONS 
A l l  the long l i f e  spacecraft have had 
s t r e s s fu l  f l i gh t  control and real-time 
fa i lure  diagnostic problems despite 
capabi l i ty  i n  the hardware e 
FAILURE REPORTING, CONTINUITY OF 
EXPERIENCE 
Future space programs should, a t  t he i r  
outset ,  make studies similar t o  t h i s  
such tha t  experience can be effect ively 
used. Repetitive or  anomalous f l i g h t  
problems generally have a source design 
weakness o r  an unknown operational 
environment. Fail-safe concept of 
f l i gh t  operation i s  not always possible 
due t o  equipment l imitations.  
RECOMMENDAT IONS 
D. FLIGHT OPERATIONS 
Plan operational workarounds t o  
handle degraded modes of the system 
especially for  fa i lure  of non-redundant 
e lement s . 
E. FAILURE REPORTING, CONTINUITY OF 
EXPERIENCE 
Feedback of past  problems and f a i lu re  
experience in to  design should progress 
from the i n i t i a l  preliminary design 
review t o  the f i n a l  cr i t ical  design 
review and should be a formal process. 
Continuation of such inputs throughout 
tes t ing and f l i gh t  operations i s  needed 
t o  ensure the maximum return of 
problem experience. 
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